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1  INTRODUCTION: THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS AND 
THE VOICE OF THE BENEFICIARY
Is the South African Constitution a ‘people’s document’? Does it give voice to, 
encourage and protect the actions of the poor, the homeless, the marginalised 
and the excluded? If the meaning of the rights in the South African Bill of 
Rights emerges through a complex interaction between the words on paper 
and its ‘open community of interpreters’,1 to what extent does it empower the 
‘practices of resistance and struggle’ of the oppressed and marginalised, the 
poor and the homeless to ‘name human rights and to put them to work’?2 Can 
we interpret the rights in the South African Constitution in such an activist 
way? This democratic conception of rights goes beyond, but draws upon Jen-
nifer Nedelsky’s idea that a ‘constitutional dialogue’ between the branches of 
the State should decide the content and meaning of rights in a society.3 This 
dialogue should make specific allowance for the participation of the benefici-
ary in both words and action. In this sense the citizen becomes the subject 
or author of rights, and we may arrive at a conception of rights that enables 
democracy to exert real influence over society.
An activist interpretation – or ‘performative’ construction of the meaning of 
the Constitution – is possible.4 Rights have to be performed in their social and 
historical settings, and State, civil society and market-based actions are funda-
mental to the realisation of rights, particularly socio-economic rights; and the 
South African Constitution, it is claimed here, can be interpreted in this way. In 
this sense we need to develop an understanding of socio-economic rights that 
acknowledges the contingent nature of these rights. Socio-economic rights are 
not only realisable in different ways at different times, but also depend on the 
relative abilities of different actors to realise them, and on the changing pref-
1 Du Plessis L ‘Legal academics and the open community of constitutional interpreters’ (1996)12 
SAJHR 214-229.
2 Baxi U ‘Politics of reading human rights: Inclusion and exclusion within the production of human 
rights’ in Meckled-Garcia S and Cali B (eds) The legalization of human rights: Municipality perspec-
tives of human rights and human rights law (2006) 182. (Emphasis in original).
3 Nedelsky J ‘Reconceiving rights as relationship’ (1993) 1 Review of Constitutional Studies 1.
4 See also Malan N ‘Rights, the public and the South African Constitution: Civil society and the 
performance of rights’ (2008) 31 Anthropology Southern Africa 58.
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erences of the beneficiary. These factors force us to consider socio-economic 
rights not only as things that need to be ‘delivered’ with some kind of unchang-
ing ‘core-content’ but rather as concerted and co-ordinated efforts by multiple 
social actors and hence as broad social projects.5 Chirwa is of the opinion 
that the horizontal application of rights requires ‘that various actors discharge 
various levels of duty’.6 These levels of duty are clarified in this reading of the 
Constitution by using the right to have access to social security7 as an example. 
A paradigm for the realisation of socio-economic rights should take due cog-
nisance of the limits of the State and the limits of self-provision, and address 
these inequities. A truly transformative interpretation of rights would empower 
the poor, the homeless, the excluded and the marginalised to overcome the 
limitations of the history, structure and abilities of society, and enable them to 
realise their rights in concert with different forms of social provision and the 
opportunities that there are in society. A step towards this objective would be 
to indicate how the Constitution empowers its ‘open community of interpreters’ 
to do so, as well as indicating what the results of this interpretation would be: 
The democratisation of rights by the allocation of different levels of duties to, 
and empowerment of, different actors.
This article is structured as follows: It starts by clarifying what a performative 
conception of rights entails by reference to certain perennial issues in the history 
and jurisprudence of socio-economic rights. This sets the terms of engagement 
with the Constitution and the jurisprudence of rights. The article shows how 
the Constitution gives substance to such a conception of rights that empowers 
multiple social actors, which in turn allows it to recognise the voice of ordinary 
citizens in the development of rights. It creates a new language of rights that 
empowers certain actors to realise rights themselves, and for others. This read-
ing of rights has certain implications for State, market and civil society action, 
and I conclude with a discussion that clarifies these different responsibilities.
2  RIGHTS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE
Soon after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, De Vos8 made the state-
ment that:
‘The concept of the individual as an active subject of all economic and social develop-
ment is fundamental to a realistic understanding of this obligation [to fulfil rights]. The 
individual is expected, whenever possible through his or her own efforts and by the use 
of own resources, to find ways to satisfy his or her own needs, individually or in associa-
tion with others. However, use of a person’s own resources requires that the person has 
resources that can be used – typically political power, land and/or capital, or labour.’
5 Pieterse E & Van Donk M ‘Incomplete ruptures: The political economy of realising socio-economic 
rights in South Africa’ 4-5 (Paper prepared for the Community Law Centre colloquium Realising 
socio-economic rights in South Africa: Progress and challenges (March 2002)).
6 Chirwa DM Obligations of non-state actors in relation to economic, social and cultural rights under the 
South African Constitution (2002).
7 Section 27(1)(c) Constitution 1996.
8 De Vos P ‘Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights? Social and economic rights in South 
Africa’s 1996 Constitution’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 87.
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This quote implies quite strongly that the individual is the subject of rights, 
and that it is the abilities and position of this individual in society that would 
determine the extent to which rights may be realised. The implications of this 
view of rights are quite far reaching, and here the argument will be made that it 
could be construed to include the following: In the field of political philosophy it 
suggests that the social order created by rights would be created by empowered 
and active citizens, and that they would thus be in a position to transform the 
social order so that their own rights may be realised.9 In this sense a performa-
tive conception of rights can be identified with a strong democratic programme 
that empowers citizens in society, as it is ultimately the abilities of citizens that 
realises rights, and we may argue that even the abilities of the State (primarily 
through taxation) are almost completely dependent on the abilities of the citi-
zenry. Furthermore, it also suggests that due allowance should be made for the 
participation of the beneficiary or subject of rights (as opposed to the object of 
rights, which is the State) in the social programmes that realises rights. From 
here it follows that rights should also have as object social and economic policy, 
as this is what enables the subject of rights to realise their own rights. Socio-
economic rights are realised by the grand social project of ‘development’, and in 
this sense we need to develop the jurisprudence of rights to actively engage in 
social and economic policy. Besides these concerns, which may be construed to 
include progressive recommendations on changing society, it is also necessary 
to acknowledge the inabilities of many to realise their own rights themselves, 
and that thus a performative conception of rights should also include a perspec-
tive on dependency and the interdependencies we all have in our own projects 
of realising rights. It is important to note that when the State faces clear limits in 
realising rights, the underlying social order is problematic: It may point towards 
gross inequality and underdevelopment in the sense that adequate access to 
resources, the factors of production and political power is lacking.
A strong democratic programme suggests multiple actors of rights, and 
seeing that it is the peculiar abilities, position and, most of all, the interde-
pendencies of each in society that would realise rights, we have to accept the 
possibility that rights may be realised in co-operative endeavours by different 
actors at different moments in history. If we subscribe to the idea that society 
governs itself through democracy, it is clear that the citizen is much more than 
merely the atomic unit of society. Society governing itself implies that the citi-
zen (together with other citizens) is the architect of society, and, furthermore, 
acquiesces to this created social order. Society, specifically the governors, 
can only make decisions based on the acquiescence and participation of the 
governed. The realisation of rights by the citizen is what the State should 
protect and foster as this also constitutes the material through which the 
State receives the means to realise rights. The State thus occupies a second-
ary place in the rights regime – as object of rights – after that of the subject of 
rights or the citizen. However, the question of State action for rights thus only 
9 This draws upon the insight of Karl Klare that we have entered a period of ‘transformative constitu-
tionalism’ in South Africa. See Klare K E ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 
14 SAJHR 146.
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emerges after the citizen is unable to realise rights herself, and traditionally 
this is how the important social programme of social assistance was treated. 
However, this ignores the intimate and fundamental interdependencies we all 
have, and substitutes care-giving with social assistance. This does not mean 
the State should at this point enter the fray and supply the goods or services 
for the realisation of socio-economic rights. It could also mean that the State 
should first of all create the conditions for social actors to co-operatively 
realise rights, for instance, by regulating or compensating the market and 
civil society, so that they are enabled to realise rights themselves, and for 
others. Below I will show that this model could be supported by a reading of 
the South African Constitution on the realisation of socio-economic rights. It 
thus implies that the State’s obligations are, first, to regulate society so that 
the factors of production (which could be more than land, labour and capital, 
and should include human capital, specifically education and health) are dis-
tributed equitably so that people are able to realise their rights themselves. A 
second level of regulation can be identified: To regulate the actions of second-
ary or non-State actors that realise the rights of others. It is only after these 
possibilities have been exhausted that we may identify direct duties of the 
State in the realisation of rights, and in this sense we may demand that the 
State supply the necessary goods or services accompanying rights directly.
A performative conception of rights should not necessarily be seen as ret-
rogressive because of its emphasis on the abilities of the actor. In contexts of 
dependency, as is often evident with the right to have access to social secu-
rity, this emphasis could nevertheless be retrogressive if not accompanied by 
measures that would either compensate the care-giver or supply the goods 
or services directly through state agencies. However, empowering subjects of 
rights to realise rights could avoid many of the problems associated with State 
provision, and has the benefit of building the content of rights on the wishes, 
needs and aspirations of the beneficiaries. Many critiques of rights as being 
culturally inappropriate or an instrument of hegemony can be countered with 
this view of rights. Even a conception of rights that takes it as the final and 
ultimate responsibility of the State would stand or fall by this criterion, as the 
State ultimately depends on the citizenry for its revenue – rights should be 
what people would choose if they had the opportunity to do so.
If we adopt a performative view of rights, it becomes inevitable then that we 
should consider issues of economic and social policy. This contextualises the 
nature and content of rights within their social and historical settings, and as 
such does not take rights as transcendental givens or essential categories that 
are unchanging over time. The notion of performative rights derives, amongst 
others, from the anthropologist Paul Richards’10 opinion that agriculture is 
not ‘knowledge’ but rather ‘performance’. Agriculture cannot be captured by 
instructions or procedures for the propagation of crops (although that helps) 
but it is rather that which can be performed under certain conditions and at 
certain historical moments. It is not feasible to understand rights in the sense 
of an a-historical product of culture, as they would have to be re-created 
10 Richards P Indigenous agricultural revolution: Ecology and food production in West Africa (1985).
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in every historical moment over and over again, as circumstances change 
and resources wax and wane. Rights, furthermore, cannot be captured by 
technical prescription, as these need to be enacted time and again. Rights 
are, however, not indeterminate, and a performative view of rights could 
emerge once we understand the constraints under which action is taken. In 
this regard notice can be taken of the philosopher JL Austin’s clarification of 
performative utterances.11 This shows that rights are more than merely words 
on paper, but also points to the fact that rights are ‘real’ only when we subse-
quently commence with a certain procedure of action that would lead to the 
desired effect, and that this needs to be completed by certain actors. Talking 
of rights can thus be seen as talking of certain actions to be taken.
The performative approach to rights, furthermore, has strong affinities with 
what is emerging in philosophy as the human capability approach.12 This per-
spective on rights is unavoidable because rights do invoke considerations of 
justice and ‘we cannot undertake any sort of life unless we can carry out these 
basic human functions’.13 The absence of the satisfaction of rights would make 
human life difficult. The ways we allocate resources to realising them, and the 
ways we articulate our preferences about how they are to be realised through 
our practical reason have to be done in a democratic context where argumenta-
tion, deliberation, the material resources of society and social choices count.
What is important in a contingent and performative view of rights is the 
need to find a conception of rights relevant for a particular society. To do so 
needs certain process freedoms which are important because of the difficulty 
of determining the content of rights. We need to ask:
‘How can we go about ascertaining the content of human rights and of basic capabilities 
when our values are supposed to be quite divergent, especially across borders of nation-
ality and community? Can we have anything like a universal approach to these ideas, in 
a world where cultures differ and practical preoccupations are also diverse?’14
The idea being defended here is that the content of socio-economic rights 
(indeed any right) cannot be seen as fixed as the content of rights seems to 
be less important than what they allow us to do, since ‘we value capabili-
ties … and the possession of goods with the corresponding characteristics is 
instrumentally and contingently valued only to the extent that it helps in the 
achievement of the thing that we do value, viz. capabilities’.15
Focusing the ‘core-content’ approach to rights and John Rawls’ idea 
of ‘basic’ public goods has been central in rights jurisprudence, but both 
these approaches do not place enough emphasis on the agency behind the 
realisation of rights.16 A performative approach reminds us of the differing 
11 Austin J L How to do things with words (1965) 14-15.
12 Sen A K ‘Human rights and capabilities’ (2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 151.
13 King P ‘Housing as a freedom right’ (2003) 18 Housing Studies 667.
14 Sen (n 12 above) 152.
15 Sen A K ‘Rights and capabilities’ in Honderich T (ed) Morality and objectivity: A tribute to J L Mackie 
(1985) 139.
16 Bilchitz D ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1; Bilchitz D ‘Giving socio-economic rights 
teeth: The minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 118 SALJ 484; Rawls J A theory of justice (rev ed 
1999).
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capabilities of different actors, including the State, and also of the fact that 
these actors inevitably have to co-operate and compete. This interaction 
is what establishes institutions over time, and it can also explain the ways 
welfare provision becomes part of the normal course of economic and social 
development. This approach may thus integrate our assessment of the reali-
sation of rights with broader processes of change in society.
This view of rights implicates the relationships between social actors, and 
acknowledges the interdependencies between people and that this forms the 
base of its philosophical enumeration.17 Kittay points to the fact that socio-
economic rights cannot be realised by a compensatory system only, but also 
by the recognition of the interdependence of care-work.18 Kittay19 further argues 
that a system of social security should protect and compensate care-work. 
Underlying such a system is the acknowledgement that the abilities of people 
and society to realise rights, indeed even the functioning of such a compensa-
tory system, fundamentally depends on the abilities of citizens in society. 
This needs a set of approaches to social regulation different from that which 
we have come to expect from a State-centred view of the duties of rights.
Such a view of social regulation, dependency and welfare will inevitably 
have to focus on the system of (public and philanthropic) funding of civil 
society organisations and of care-work that is often older than State-supported 
welfare intervention. It also suggests that the economy needs to be viewed 
as a system of co-operation that – as far as rights are concerned – implies the 
need for equitable access to the factors of production. Two crucial issues are 
apparent at this juncture: The need to make provision for the compensation 
of care-work, and the need for economic regulation to ensure equity in access 
17 Nedelsky J ‘Law, boundaries and the bounded self’ (1990) 30 Representations 162; Nedelsky J (n 3 
above); Kittay E F Love’s labor. Essays on women, equality and dependency (1999).
18 Kittay (n 17 above) 28 articulates it as follows:
   ‘The question for a connection-based equality is not: What rights are due to me by virtue of my 
status as equal, such that these rights are consistent with those of all other individuals who have 
the status of an equal? Instead, the question is: What are my responsibilities to others with whom 
I stand in specific relations and what are the responsibilities of others to me, so that I can be well 
cared for and have my needs addressed even as I care for and respond to the needs of those who 
depend on me?’
 It is worthwhile to reflect upon reading this passage that Sachs J (in Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para 54) made the remark that:
   ‘Health care rights by their very nature have to be considered not only in a traditional legal context 
structured around the ideas of human autonomy but in a new analytical framework based on 
the notion of human interdependence A healthy life depends upon social interdependence: the 
quality of air, water, and sanitation which the state maintains for the public good; the quality of 
one’s caring relationships, which are highly correlated to health; as well as the quality of health 
care furnished officially by medical institutions and provided informally by family, friends, and the 
community.’
 He continues to say that in such a situation a ‘broad framework of constitutional principles [is nec-
essary to govern] the right of access to scarce resources and to adjudicate between competing rights 
bearers’. This, significantly, is ‘defining [of] the circumstances in which the rights may most fairly 
and effectively be enjoyed’. These words are tantamount to sanctioning a performative conception 
of rights that depends for its effectiveness on the arrangements found in society. Although this case 
did not affirm the applicant’s right to medical treatment, and was widely criticised for this, it did 
develop the jurisprudence of social rights in progressive directions. 
19 Kittay (n 17 above) 140 – 141
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to the factors of production. We should thus ask whether the Constitution 
will allow an interpretation of socio-economic rights that could incorporate 
these two issues. Besides the important issue of dependency dealt with 
above, a performative reading of rights will focus on how we should under-
stand self-provisioning from a philosophical perspective, how economic and 
social policy affect rights, and, of course, procedural issues in creating the 
content of rights. I discuss each briefly before considering with the text of the 
Constitution.
3  THE PERFORMANCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
AND SOCIAL SECURITY RIGHTS: IDENTIFYING THE 
TERMS OF ANALYSIS
It was the inequities of economic production, the afflictions of the body, and 
the passage to old age that led to the idea of social security. The Roman 
Emperor Charlemange promulgated one of the first poor laws in 779.20 Booth 
and Rowntree’s studies of pauperism and poverty in industrialising Britain, 
and, in France, Antoine-Nicholas de Condorcet’s and August Comte’s idea of 
‘social science’ to improve social conditions,21 ushered in the era of modern 
social security. Rights to social security are intertwined with the inequities 
of capitalism, and in a sense articulate Polànyi’s22 idea that we need to tame 
capitalism lest it destroys itself. Rights to social security were articulated 
against the state (social assistance) and capital (social insurance) in both 
the context of the industrial revolution, and colonialism.23 This feature of 
social security – as compensation for the inequities of capitalist production 
– has infused the character of socio-economic rights.24 This characterisation 
of social rights understandably underplays the abilities of all, including the 
poor, to realise their own rights. It also leads to a moral deficit in those who 
are able to realise their rights, as the State as a corporate entity has to accept 
responsibility for the rights of the able, and this obscures both responsibility 
20 Goodin R E and Mitchell D ‘Foundations of the welfare state: An overview’ in Goodin R E and 
Mitchell D (eds) The foundations of the welfare state (Vol 1) (2000) ix.
21 Ishay M R The history of human rights from ancient times to the globalization era (2008) 335.
22 Polànyi K P The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time (1957) 73.
23 Ishay M R The human rights reader: Major political essays, speeches, and dowments from ancient times 
to the present (2ed 2007) 114-116; Mensch E V ‘The colonial origins of liberal property rights’ (1982) 
31 Buffalo Law Review 654.
24 To gain clarity on the above issues, it is necessary to understand whether social security benefits are 
qualitatively different from benefits obtainable from social policy measures, and from ‘development’ 
in general (Dixon J Social security in global perspective (1999) 276). Economists seem to be happy 
to condone ‘social security’-based intervention in the economy, whilst frowning upon other kinds 
of State intervention. We should question the practices of ‘International Development’ and its con-
ditionality, since social security was the one factor that is common in the rise of the modern OECD 
states, but absent from international development aid (Townsend P ‘The right to social security and 
national development: Lessons from OECD experience for low income countries’ (2007) (Issues in 
social protection, ILO Discussion paper 18)! It is nevertheless difficult to distinguish in a watertight 
way between benefits in general and those that are ‘social security’ benefits, as all these benefits do 
have social security effects. (Oliver MP et al (eds) Social security: A legal analysis (2003) addresses 
this problem by distinguishing between formal social security (as social insurance and assistance), 
informal social security (through the family and civil society organisations) and indirect social 
security (benefits obtained through social policy delivery)). It seems that these effects (protection 
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and dependency. It also structures activism in such a way that the means of 
production are attacked, whilst this is in fact the means that the State, and 
those able to, would utilise to realise their own rights. These contradictions in 
what could be termed a liberal view of rights are ultimately disempowering for 
citizens, as they bestow on the State the authorship of rights (as it decides the 
terms and programmes of realisation of social rights) and thus fundamentally 
undermines the transformative potential inherent in those marginalised from 
the existent social order. Poverty and inequality – the objects of change for 
social security rights – are due to the character of the current social order. 
These problems can only be addressed by a change in the social order, and 
a compensatory system would contradictorily still depend on the means that 
create inequity to compensate for it. A performative view of rights would 
acknowledge the above contradictions as in the short term compensation is 
necessary, but, from a theoretical point of view, a solution has to be found 
for poverty, and this would have to lead to greater participation of the mar-
ginalised in the economy. This in fact is only possible if we acknowledge 
economic interdependence in society. The policy solution would thus steer 
towards the development of human capital in the people, and the expansion 
of the freedom of people, not only because the current ‘knowledge’ and serv-
ice economy demands it, but because the act of participating in the economy 
constitutes the raw material through which it is ‘created’. Below I show that 
this view of the economy is accommodated by the requirement that there 
must be ‘access to’ the relevant socio-economic rights in the Constitution. 
This implies something different from receiving the things rights spoken of on 
demand, and rather suggests that we need to be mindful of how the structure 
of the economy allows these things to be realised. This opens the door to an 
appreciation of social and economic policy in constitutional interpretation.
The welfare state was a prominent feature of the post-war era, and insti-
tutionalised social security as never before. Social security occupies a very 
peculiar place in economic policy: it is a paradigmatic form of state eco-
nomic intervention, and seems to be acceptable practice for States in the 
face of economic liberalism, reinforcing the contradictions mentioned above. 
Davis’s25 idea that ‘constitutions have allowed a large degree of legislative 
discretion in choosing an appropriate form of governmental economic activ-
ity’, undoubtedly would lead economic policy makers to converge on the 
idea of social security to correct the imperfections of the market. It should, 
however, be clear that a neutral stance of a constitution vis-à-vis social and 
economic policy in the face of economic inequity would not be defendable 
against ‘human damage’) play a big role in economic development, and in this sense social security 
is different from, say, subsidised credit. The right to social security could refer to the formal benefits 
termed ‘social security’ but also to the protection that would result from all policy measures in place 
and the charity of those with a conscience (Dréze J and Sen). A ‘Public action for social security: 
Foundations and strategy’ in Ahamad E et al (eds) Social security in developing countries (1991). Due 
to the complexity of these many kinds of economic intervention, it is possible that we may never gain 
clarity on how social security is different from other benefits, and the issue lies rather in understand-
ing to what extent, and how, this right would allow state interference in the economy.
25 Davis D ‘Economic activity’ in Chaskalson M et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (1996) 
ch 29 4.
2009-2-text.indd   78 10/22/10   9:29:23 AM
79
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RIGHT TO HAVE ACCESS TO SOCIAL SECURITY
in the long run. A performative view of rights conjures up an image of an 
activist State that purposefully harnesses the means of capitalist production 
for the economic empowerment and participation of the poor. Self-provision 
implies not only that the subject can satisfy rights, but also that the subject 
can contribute resources to State compensatory projects. A critical require-
ment of this avenue for the realisation of rights would allocate certain duties 
and responsibilities to market actors, and the question of how to enforce a 
collective responsibility for business associations in civil society for rights 
needs to be clarified.
In cases where rights are realised by private actors, the claim has been 
made that the actions and resources of private actors represent part of the 
resources available to the State.26 In this sense we need to see the State not as 
a governing entity or part of the ruling party, but as part of society. The ques-
tion of subsidiarity to the State, and consequent responsibility, thus moves 
away from the State as a corporate entity, and towards civil society. Private 
actors are not only active in the realisation of the right to social insurance, 
but they are important actors in the provision of certain forms of social assist-
ance, in the form of care giving but also micro-insurance and, related thereto, 
micro-credit. Their endeavours and resources need to be aligned with the 
values that shape a society. To what extent can we subsume the actors of 
such forms of social security under the provisions of the Constitution? Can 
private actors act in the public interest? With such a view of rights and social 
security, can we apply the Constitution to a field of social action (the ‘free’ or 
private economy) that affects many poor people’s lives? Can we regulate the 
actions of important private actors that affect the lives of the poor, and still 
align their productivity and innovation to the values that underlie a society? 
It could give the poor a voice over the actions of more powerful actors and 
allow the energies of such private actors to benefit the poor, while they benefit 
from increased economic participation.
The economy that realises rights progressively is an economy that needs a 
strong and active, but not directly, interventionist State to structure its work-
ings.27 Such an economy would enable – in a progressive way – the realisation 
of rights by the actors participating therein. In this sense the resources of 
society are in fact being used for the realisation of rights. It also means that 
those who are directly involved in caregiving (as they realise rights ‘in the 
name of’ the State) could draw on the resources of the State as compensation 
for this task which is the final responsibility of the State. The State can thus 
realise its objectives through others, and in this sense we need to develop 
further the regulatory regime surrounding social and economic policy so that 
it adequately acknowledges the importance of rights. Porteous avers that 
business practices need to focus on creating opportunities and expanding 
the ‘access frontier’ which, in essence, is a comment on the structure of the 
economy and the magnitude of participation therein. This idea emerged in 
26 Churchill C (ed) Protecting the poor: A microinsurance compendium (2006) 49-50.
27 Porteous D Making financial markets work for the poor (2004). Some call this a ‘developmental 
state’.
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the context of the Financial Sector Charter (which, inclusive of the current 
emphasis on broad-based Black economic empowerment,28 is unfortunately 
quite silent on the realisation of rights) that demanded increased access by 
the unbanked into the mainstream financial services industry. What this 
underscores is that civil society associations, of both civic and market based 
players, have to accept a collective obligation for the realisation of rights in 
society.
The collective responsibility of firms and civil associations is thus very 
important to create such a system of accountability. Everyone who participates 
in the economy – unwittingly, but sometimes consciously – affects the eco-
nomic structure. Individual freedom can be protected but a form of collective 
responsibility seems necessary. Certain economies are better able to realise 
rights than others. It is necessary to develop a critical view of how a certain 
economic structure affects poverty, but also how certain trajectories of growth 
enable people to realise their rights themselves. At this juncture it would be 
possible to examine economic policy, specifically competition policy. Is there 
a necessary diversity of firms in an economic sector that would maximise 
employment of, and benefits to, the citizens in general? A critical view of 
economic policy will strive for the participation by the poor in the develop-
ment of economic policy so that they could directly campaign for measures 
to improve their plight, and work towards a more equitable structure for the 
economy through their participation. To do so implies an assessment not 
only of economic policy, but of the kind of jobs that are created. In addition, 
we need to assess the weight of different kinds of firms in the economy, as an 
issue in competition policy. Social policy should enable people to realise their 
rights themselves by investing in measures (like education and health) that 
increases their autonomy.29
If the above is the case, the question of the actors of these rights becomes 
focused on co-operative social projects. Can we push the idea of the horizon-
tality of rights to the point where we see the citizen as actor and subject of 
rights who acts within the context of a democratically mandated State? It is 
possible to construe social policy measures closely on the living conditions 
and interests of beneficiaries, which is also possible with rights.30 Participa-
tory strategies devolve responsibility for rights to the beneficiary, but to say 
that rights could be autochthonously realised by economic participation goes 
much further than participation in social policy development. This bestows 
28 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.
29 This approach to the realisation of rights to social security is evident among some of the advocates 
of ‘developmental social welfare’ which is the policy term adopted by the present government. 
This relates to how social security and other social policy measures, particularly, education, health 
and income opportunities, would ‘foster inclusion of people in the development process through 
employment and self-employment and raise the standards of living of the poor and unemployed. 
Investments in building the capacities of poor people to participate productively in the economy 
through human capital development (such as education and skills development), social capital 
development (such as social networks), micro enterprises and credit’ (Patel L Social welfare and 
social development in South Africa (2005) 30). 
30 VenneKlaasen L et al ‘Rights-based approaches and beyond: challenges of linking rights and partici-
pation’; (2004) (IDS Working Paper 235).
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on the subject authorship of the content of rights by his or her endeavours in 
society. By being able to gain access to social security, health, housing, food 
and water, and the other rights, through the use of income is a significant 
means to satisfy these rights. But this model of how rights are to be performed 
can only serve as a basis for analysis if we are critical about whether there is 
equity in gaining access to the factors of production. It asks questions about 
the nature of participation; the governance of those organisations that attempt 
to realise rights for others; and about the institutional structure wherein all 
this takes place. It allows a critical perspective on both economic policy and 
the economic structure, and the place of human development in these. Rights 
thus apply to the State, to the programmes that facilitate influence over that 
State, as participatory programmes do, and the autochthonous endeavours 
we all make at times to realise our own needs and rights.
The above problems constitute fundamental issues in the interpretation of 
horizontal rights, and are particularly important in our understanding of how 
socio-economic rights are realised in society. A performative reading of rights 
in the Constitution has to address all these issues, and I do so below.
4  THE PERFORMANCE OF RIGHTS AND THE TEXT OF 
THE CONSTITUTION
The above needs to be brought to bear on the text of the Constitution and the 
argument will run as follows: The horizontal application of the Constitution 
and the justiciability of socio-economic rights establish that non-state actors 
may realise rights, and that they have certain duties. This, and the question of 
‘appropriate social assistance’, allows us to develop the right to have access 
to social security (and related rights) in ways that acknowledge both the 
responsibilities of the State as well as the responsibilities of non-State actors. 
It confirms that rights may be realised through a regulative and facilitative 
State. Furthermore, it is possible to give substantial protection to these efforts 
at realising rights if we consider the subsidiarity of such non-State actors to 
the State, and the consequent possibility that they be considered ‘organs of 
State’. The democratic mandate of the State in this case is not in conflict 
with the actions of non-State actors, as the Constitution also emphasises the 
fact that the state should allow for the participation of the citizenry in the 
development of its own policies. As non-State actors are not subservient to 
the formal institutions of electoral democracy, it is necessary to conceptual-
ise their accountability for the realisation of rights as a function of how the 
courts adjudicate cases and resolve disputes about socio-economic rights. 
This adjudication, through the rules of standing, establishes a democratic 
and deliberative accountability. Issues of social and economic policy are 
implicit in the fact that non-State actors realise rights (as policy is an ines-
capable fact of social and economic life), but receive formal and substantive 
recognition by the inclusion of the phrase ‘access to’ in the enumeration of 
selected socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights. The inclusion of social 
and economic policy considerations in the realisation of rights, and consider-
ing the fact that a participatory ethos is implicit in the way rights are to be 
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realised, lead me to consider the implications the generous rules of standing 
that control access to the court have on the governance of non-State actors. 
The above arguments give substantial support to the idea that we should 
interpret rights as things to be performed, and I conclude on the implications 
of this for the responsibilities of the diverse range of non-state actors that may 
realise socio-economic rights.
4.1  Horizontality and justiciability: the nature of the State 
and the empowerment of non-State actors
Section 7(2) of the Constitution demands that the State must ‘respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’ – we have to see all the rights 
(political and civil, and socio-economic31) as justiciable. The socio-economic 
rights, under the South African Constitution, do not follow the classical sepa-
ration of civil and political rights from socio-economic rights. It is evident in 
section 2 that ‘law or conduct inconsistent’ with the Constitution is ‘invalid’, 
pointing out that it is more than laws that have to uphold rights. As only 
States make laws, and because conduct refers to both the actions of people 
and that of States, people also have to uphold rights in their own conduct 
with others.
Section 8(2) reinforces the above by stating: ‘A provision of the Bill of 
Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any 
duty imposed by the right.’ In section 8(1) the application of rights to the 
State is affirmed, and the differences in these two sections of the Constitution 
allow an interpretation of rights that has direct bearing on the duties of both 
the State and non-State actors. It is clear that the Constitution places some 
measure of responsibility on society in general (family, civil society, State and 
market) to realise rights, but it does not sanction the absence of the State 
in this endeavour. As the State has a direct responsibility to realise rights, 
this construction of the rights regime, and particularly section 8(2), indicates 
that the responsibility of the State is to ensure that, when a right is indeed 
applicable to a non-State actor, a regulatory regime is created to ensure that 
rights are realised adequately through the conduct of others32. This construc-
tion empowers private actors to realise rights, and in this sense also allows 
us to determine what the duties of the State in this regard should be. Sections 
26(2) and 27(2) mention that ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ 
31 Socio-economic rights are dealt with in s 22 on freedom of trade, occupation and profession, in s 23 
on labour relations, s 24 on the environment, s 25 on property and, most importantly, ss 26, 27 and 
28 delineate rights of access to housing, health care, food, water and social security, and the rights of 
children. Section 29 deals with education, and s 35 deals, amongst others, with the socio-economic 
rights of detained persons.
32 See also s 3(2)(b): ‘All citizens are – equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.’ 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in its Preamble that ‘every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national 
and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance…’and Art (29)1 
declares: ‘Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible.’ (Available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html) 
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should be taken to ‘achieve the progressive realisation’ of rights. Legislative 
measures have the connotation that the State has a direct duty to ensure 
rights are realised, but could, if in conjunction with ‘other measures’, point to 
a more flexible view of State action. The objective of realising rights could be 
achieved by the facilitation and regulation of non-State actors, as is done in 
the regulation of the economic sphere through legislation, like the Companies 
Act.33 This duty of the State includes not interfering in actions that others take 
to realise rights, in addition to enabling others to realise rights. Both these 
requirements imply a framework for action so that the actions of others may 
be changed and encouraged, if necessary, to realise rights.34
The empowerment of non-State actors to realise rights does suggest a sub-
stantial devolution of power. However, without some attempt at ameliorating 
the differences in resources between the State and non-State actors that real-
ise rights, this devolution would be profoundly unjust. Without access to the 
resources of society, this will disadvantage many civil society based actors, 
particularly resource poor ‘welfare’ organisations. Fortunately this issue has 
been given some attention in the literature.
Liebenberg points out that, when social or economic rights are violated the 
courts, being empowered to develop the common law in the context of their 
domestic jurisdiction, could fashion
‘an award for preventative damages against the state … made in favour of an independ-
ent state institution (for example a Human Rights Commission) or a non-governmental 
organisation with the necessary skills and programmes aimed at preventing future viola-
tions of the right in question. The recipient may be ordered to present a plan of action and 
to report back to the court on its implementation at regular intervals’.35
This possibility in the repertoire of remedies for violations of socio-economic 
rights is a progressive response to the challenges of horizontality, as it could 
33 The South African Government’s Department of Trade & Industry’s guidelines for corporate law 
reform (South African company law for the 21st century. Guidelines for corporate law reform (2004)12) 
states: ‘Good company law can create a protective and fertile environment for economic activity 
but it cannot, by itself, create that activity. Economic citizens in creating such activity respond to 
a wide range of incentives and disincentives, one of which is a clear, facilitating, predictable and 
consistently enforced governing law.’ 
34 Liebenberg S ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Chaskalson M et al (eds) Constitutional 
law of South Africa 2ed (2005) ch33 7 mentions that the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) has identified two aspects of the ‘duty to fulfil’ rights, of 
which one is to realise rights directly. The second is ‘[a] duty to enable and assist communities to 
gain access to socio-economic rights. This would include, for example, adopting enabling policies 
and legislation that facilitate and regulate access to the various goods socio-economic rights are 
designed to deliver’. 
35 Liebenberg S ‘The protection of economic and social rights in domestic legal systems’ in Eide A et 
al (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights. A textbook 2 ed (2001) 70; (n 34 above) 62; ‘Socio-
economic rights’ in Chaskalson M et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1998) ch 41 52. The 
question of compensation has emerged in the case of President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others 2005 (5) SA (CC). There are certain differences 
between Modderklip and the ideas discussed here. They are not substantial, and could be seen 
to establish the principle that compensation could be given to those who prevent the violation of 
others’ socio-economic rights. Support for this programme of change can be found in Roman law. 
Although this is an altogether different field of the law than human rights, and although there are 
important differences between the current situation and the ethnographic context under the pax 
Romana, it is still worthwhile to investigate precedents for what we have in mind here. The idea of 
compensation for preventive relief has certain affinities with Roman law’s negotiorum gestio. Thomas 
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ameliorate economic inequalities between State, market and civil society. It 
fundamentally affects the relationships between State and other actors when 
rights are at stake. Far from detracting from the democratic character of soci-
ety, it in effect underlines the prominent place the individual should occupy 
in a democratic State. As the State emanates from people’s consent, we may 
view the devolution of power to realise rights as flowing therefrom. Below I 
will show that this devolution cannot be done without some consideration 
of norms and standards. It illustrates Cohen & Arato’s idea that civil society 
contributes to the ‘rationalisation’ of society, and the establishment of an 
ethical life independent of the State.36 Giving people the opportunity and 
power to realise rights represents a principled and disciplined attempt at 
social development. As many organisations in civil society are already active 
in this terrain, we may speak of the institutionalisation of an autochthonous 
ethical orientation in civil society and in welfare.
The next issue that this article addresses is the question of appropriate 
social assistance. This is important, as we may expect substantial differences 
between civil society based and state based welfare delivery. This allows us 
to determine the nature of state-society relations in the realisation of rights 
by non-State actors.
4.2  The question of appropriate social assistance
Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution does not only delineate ‘…the right to 
have access to – social security…’ but also that those ‘unable to support 
themselves and their dependants’ have a right to have access to ‘appropri-
ate social assistance’. Even if we come to identify social security exclusively 
with monetary compensation (which would be difficult), we should allow 
for intervention other than monetary compensation by referring to the need 
for ‘appropriate social assistance’. Monetary compensation cannot, in the 
final analysis, be appropriate for all conditions and all kinds of needs. Civil 
society organisations, and perhaps some independent State institutions and 
corporations, could thus render assistance in ingenious and novel ways, 
and we may even include social services as relevant to this right. Some have 
upheld a strict separation between social security and social services,37 where 
social services refer to non-monetary interventions. I would not advocate 
for a separation between these concepts, as it would negate the fact that 
the outcome of these measures is important. Part of official social assistance 
is the programme ‘Social relief of distress’ which includes, amongst others, 
JAC says: ‘This was, in Justinian’s compilation, the performance of some service for another, without 
his request or authorisation, which imposed on him a duty of compensation.’ (Textbook of Roman 
law (1976) 321; also Kaser M Roman private law (tr Dannenbring R) 3ed (1980) 231-232). In the cur-
rent case of human rights satisfaction, what might transpire is the following: an organisation, delivers 
home based care to terminal patients. After performance of these functions, it then approaches a 
court to claim from the State relief for services and expenses incurred in delivering home based care 
to people who have no recourse to the services on offer in the public health care system. The idea of 
negtiorum gestio will enable us to clarify this situation. 
36 Cohen JL and Arato A Civil society and political theory (1992).
37 The Children’s Institute South African child gauge 2007/2008 (2008).
2009-2-text.indd   84 10/22/10   9:29:23 AM
85
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RIGHT TO HAVE ACCESS TO SOCIAL SECURITY
the provision of food, seeds and farming implements. This separation is not 
tenable, and implies we need to be flexible in determining the content of this 
right, and in determining the nature and duties of the State in enabling non-
State actors to realise rights.
The form the State should take in the project of enabling non-state actors 
to realise rights can be determined by a reading of sections 42(3) and 42(4) 
and sections 59, 72 and 118(1)(a) on Parliament and the National Council 
of Provinces, section 153 on Local Government, and section 195 on Public 
Administration, that sanction participation by the citizenry in the State’s 
activities. The possibility of compensation for preventative relief underlines 
that the State retains a residual responsibility for rights, even if non-State 
actors are involved. That is why they should be regarded as forming part of 
the available resources of the State. To form part of the resources of the State 
in this regard has implications for the ethics of engagement and participation 
of civil society in the programmes of the State. Social security forms part of 
Public Administration, has implications for local government, and also needs 
to be given attention in Parliament and the National Council of Provinces. 
Non-state action should thus be accommodated in the processes of legisla-
tive and policy development of the State. As action is taken by such entities, 
we have to allow for regulative and facilitative duties of the State, as opposed 
to the duty to take direct action. This might not be a controversial practice, 
as there are ample examples available of such engagement. This issue is, 
however, not so simple, particularly if seen in the context of subsidiarity and 
the question of what an ‘organ of State’ is. This would allow the status of civil 
society organisations that realise rights to be elevated to an official level, and 
not only devolve resources to such organisations, but also strong require-
ments of justice.
4.3  The subsidiarity of organisations to the State
Subsidiarity is an age old principle in governance and refers to the need to 
devolve power and responsibility to its lowest practical level. Malherbe has 
examined the question of subsidiarity in the context of the privatisation of 
State assets, and concluded, after applying the so-called ‘three tiered test’,38 
that:
38 Malherbe R ‘Privatisation and the Constitution: Some exploratory observations’ (2001) 26 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 5. See also Van der Vyver JD ‘The private sphere in constitutional litiga-
tion’ (1994) 5 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 385; Du Plessis LM ‘The genesis of 
the provisions concerned with the application and interpretation of the chapter on fundamental 
rights in South Afica’s transitional Constitution’ (1994) 19 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 706; 
and Clapham A The human rights obligations of non-state actors (2006). In the interim Constitution 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993) application was more narrowly circumscribed 
than in the final 1996 Constitution. In this sense Du Plessis and Van der Vyver were reluctant to 
conclude that non-State actors could easily be considered ‘organs of State’. It is important to note 
that the interim Constitution did not affirm socio-economic rights as justiciable, did not include 
social security rights, and had limited application to the private sphere. 
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‘[I]n the case of the Bill of Rights, its horizontal application prevents bodies bound by 
the Bill of Rights from escaping through privatisation the application of the Bill of Rights 
to their conduct’.39
This also establishes that the performance of rights be considered a public 
function, and from a generous interpretation of the provisions that govern 
subsidiarity in the Constitution, it is clear that non-state actors that realise 
rights may be considered ‘organs of state’ due to their ‘exercising a power 
or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial con-
stitution; or … exercising a public power or performing a public function 
in terms of any legislation’.40 The jurisprudence deals with this issue by 
means of a three tiered test to determine whether a ‘body’ is an organ of 
State. Scholarship and case law41 on this issue, particularly under the 1996 
Constitution has supported this interpretation, precisely because it does 
apply to the private sphere.42
Malherbe’s discussion is premised on the economic privatisation of govern-
ment entities and was intended to give clarity on the privatisation of State run 
enterprises. It was not written with non-profit organisations, nor with current 
approaches to insurance, like micro-insurance, in mind. He emphasises that 
‘private bodies not established by law, but fulfilling some of their key func-
tions under the supervision of the state, like old age homes’ might be counted 
as organs of State43. This means that:
‘banks, insurance companies and other private companies that must act in accordance 
with the applicable legislation, and old age homes and private schools that must register 
in terms of legislation, inter alia to qualify for subsidies … do not operate in terms of 
these laws; their composition, powers and functioning are not prescribed by these laws 
and they could well act without them. The purpose of these laws is to regulate aspects of 
these bodies and not to make them organs of state.’44
39 Malherbe R (n 38 above) 18. 
40 See meaning (b) of the definition of ‘organ of state’ in s 239 of the Constitution. 
41 In the Witwatersrand Local Division (Taylor, Adrian Moshe v Kurtstag NO, Rabbi M A (case no 
24825/03)) the Court had the opportunity to express its views on the application of the Bill of Rights 
to freedom of religion, which has implications for the degree to which the Bill of Rights applies to the 
private sphere. The Court upheld the right of the Jewish faith to ‘to protect the integrity of Jewish law 
and custom’[58]. This did not mean that Jewish law, or any other associative activity, is outside the 
bounds of the Bill of Rights. Malan J [40] distinguished between religious issues and ‘secular’ issues, 
and consequently the nature of the issue would decide whether the Bill of Rights applies, irrespective 
of whether it is private or not. In this sense we may infer that public issues are clearly applicable 
to constitutional scrutiny. It is also possible that this underlies the definition of an ‘organ of state’ 
as ‘fulfilling a public purpose’. When private actors take action that affects the public sphere, the 
Bill of Rights applies. The Court in the Soobramoney case (n 18 above) deferred its judgement to 
the expertise of the relevant medical practitioners, which implies some kind of subsidiarity. This is 
examined by Scott C and Alston P ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: 
a comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise, (2000) 16 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 243 who state : ‘While there are limits to which many expert communities can act as 
the kind of front-line constitutional decision-makers, which is effectively what occurred at Addington 
Hospital, the basic principle of courts taking seriously proven expertise of other institutions in giving 
meaning to constitutional rights cannot be doubted.’ 
42 Rautenbach I M ‘The Bill of Rights applies to private law and binds private persons’ (2000) 25 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 296.
43 Malherbe R (n 38 above) 18.
44 Malherbe R (n 38 above) 8.
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Not all non-state actors could thus be seen as organs of State. This is so 
because a public power or function refers in the first place to the powers 
and functions to be exercised in respect of the functional areas allocated 
to the state in terms of the constitution.45 Welfare and social security are 
functions of the State according to the Constitution, and this allows us to see 
non-State actors that realise rights as ‘organs of state’ and as subsidiary to 
the State. This conclusion is consistent with the idea that compensation may 
be given to non-State actors that realise rights, and also underlines the need 
to develop a regime of governance of such non-State actors that would be 
substantially rights-based.
We have established the broad social conditions within which rights will 
be realised by non-state actors. I engage with section 27 of the Constitution 
below, in order to infer how this will impact on the right to have access to 
social security; and conclude the interpretation of the Constitution by exam-
ining how these rights are to be enforced by a court in order to establish 
a normative democratic framework to govern non-State actors that realise 
rights. The article concludes with a look at the terrain where this framework 
is relevant.
4.4  ‘Access’ and the vision of development in the Constitution
The inclusion of ‘access to’ in some rights in the Constitution presents the 
reader with certain difficulties of interpretation. It signals a clear difference 
from the way rights are enumerated in International Law, and at face value 
could mean that ‘the Constitution guarantees each individual an opportunity 
to apply for social assistance, but does not guarantee social assistance’.46 I 
am primarily interested in how this construction affects social and economic 
policy, and the means we may employ to realise rights. It seems that we may 
not be directly entitled to the things these rights speak of, but that the condi-
tions for their realisation need to be there. This wording is there due to the 
fact that the Technical Committee that drafted this section thought it best to 
‘resist an interpretation that the state is obliged to deliver the rights directly 
and without charge to everyone. Those with sufficient resources will have the 
means of access … and will not need state assistance to secure housing’.47 
The Constitutional Court declared that the ‘Constitution does not give rise 
45 Malherebe R (n 38 above) 8. Ellmann S ‘A constitutional confluence: American ‘State action’ law 
and the application of South Africa’s socio-economic rights guarantees to private actors’ in Ellmann 
S and Andrews P (eds) The post-Apartheid constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law 
(2001) 450 is even more committed to this conclusion. He discusses housing and points out that 
if a builder is simply engaged in the activity of delivering low cost housing for a fee from the State, 
he does not incur the relevant constitutional responsibilities: ‘If the builder is simply one of many 
contractors engaged in this effort, it should not be treated as an organ of state.’ Thus, the substitution 
of the state by civil society organisations does not always lead to a re-definition of the limits of the 
State. He continues: ‘But if, for example, a single builder or builders’ association contracts to imple-
ment a large fraction of a province’s low-income housing program, then it might well be appropriate 
to see that entity as having the kind of responsibility – and power – that qualify it as an organ of 
state.’
46 Van der Merwe D Social welfare in the South African social security system (1999) 7, (his emphasis) 
(CICLASS Publication Series 1/99).
47 In Liebenberg S (n 35 above) 26.
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to a self-standing and independent right’.48 Those who do provide these for 
themselves and others are thus contributing to the duty of the State to ensure 
that access may be gained to these rights, and this can be seen as part of the 
available resources of the State.
This approach to rights seems to underlie the judgment in the Grootboom 
case.49 The Court emphasised that the provisions dealing with progressive 
realisation are key to understanding rights, unlike direct entitlement rights. In 
this sense it is significant that rights to education are enumerated without ref-
erence to ‘access to’.50 The rights of children are also not enumerated as such, 
and the courts’ emphasis that even these ‘direct’ rights do not lead to direct 
entitlement strengthens my argument considerably. Grootboom mentioned: 
‘The carefully constructed constitutional scheme for progressive realisation 
of socio-economic rights would make little sense if it could be trumped in 
every case by the rights of children to get shelter from the state on demand.’51 
This inclusion of ‘access to’ in the Bill of Rights contributed to the reluctance, 
albeit indirectly, of the Court to define the core minimum of the right.52 If the 
core minimum was evident, then the case for direct access to the right would 
have been strengthened. Instead the Court stated:
‘It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing without first identifying the needs and opportuni-
ties for the enjoyment of the right. These will vary according to factors such as income, 
unemployment, availability of land as well as poverty.’53
A reading that emphasises the actions of individuals and organisations that 
realise rights follows this interpretation more consistently than a core content 
one.
‘Access to’ thus means, among others, that we should look at how the right 
is being realised in actual practice to infer its nature. Grootboom examined 
the implications of this at length:
‘For a person to have access to adequate housing … these conditions need to be met: 
there must be land, there must be services, there must be a dwelling. Access to land for 
the purposes of housing is therefore included in the right of access to adequate housing 
in section 26. A right of access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the 
48 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
paras 30-34.
49 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC).
50 See s 29 of the 1996 Constitution.
51 See Grootboom (n 49 above) para 71.
52 This aspect of the Grootboom judgment has been criticised as it could create the impression that 
rights are ‘watered down’ if not seen as direct obligations of the State, and thus ‘children’s claims 
do not have to be accorded priority’. (Sloth-Nielsen J ‘The child’s right to social services, the right to 
social security, and primary prevention of child abuse: Some conclusions in the aftermath of Groot-
boom’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 229; Roux T ‘Giving money to children: The 
state’s constitutional obligations to provide child support grants to child headed households’ (2004) 
20 South African Journal on Human Rights 151). However, as Sloth-Nielsen later shows (Realising 
the rights of children growing up in child-headed households. A guide to laws, policies and social 
advocacy (2004) 5), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child could also be read to support this 
interpretation because it ‘promotes the family’s role in realising the rights of the child’ (above). It is 
possible to realise rights in a progressive way within these constraints.
53 See Grootboom (n 49 above) para 32.
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state who is responsible for the provision of houses, but other agents within our society, 
including individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to 
provide housing. The state must create the conditions for access to adequate housing for 
people at all economic levels in society. State policy dealing with housing must therefore 
take account of different economic levels in our society.’54
A programme to realise rights based on the above would have to acknowl-
edge non-State actors, as well as a conception of the duties of the State that 
entails the regulation and facilitation of such non-State actors. It would also 
include a consideration of social and economic policy, as well as scrutiny of 
the social conditions under which rights may be realised or violated. It does 
make demands on the State to ensure that each individual is enabled by 
social and other policy to function adequately in society. Whether this can 
be made justiciable is a different matter. From the discussion above we may 
cautiously infer that the state’s responsibility would primarily be to ensure 
that we live in a society where each person is able to provide for and pro-
tect themselves. Subjects of the State have a claim on the State only when 
these social structures, family and community structures fail to protect the 
individual. The State, in turn, is responsible to make it possible for these 
structures to contribute to the realisation of rights, and in this sense has to 
intervene in society and the economy if necessary. This is a first level of duty 
– to ensure society makes it possible to gain access to rights. A second level 
of duty would relate to the abilities and prerogatives we all have to realise 
our own rights, and in this sense the formation of human capital, through 
educational, health and other social policies should be considered. A third 
level of duty would have to deal with the provision of safety nets, like a social 
assistance system, if the above two systems fail.
Grootboom is about housing, but is surprisingly vocal on the right of access 
to social security. The fungibility of social security payments illustrates the 
plurality underlying this view of the realisation of rights. ‘If under section 27 
the state has in place programmes to provide adequate social assistance to 
those who are otherwise unable to support themselves and their dependants, 
that would be relevant to the state’s obligations in respect of other socio-
economic rights.’55 This suggests that minimal government responsibility 
for socio-economic rights rests in social security provision. Related to this, 
however, Grootboom also states: ‘[I]ssues of development and social welfare 
are raised in respect of those who cannot afford to provide themselves with 
housing.’56 Social assistance could constitute a minimum social policy meas-
ure, but a house, on the other hand, if rented out, would also be relevant to 
social security rights. Social security reform will have implications for all the 
other rights, and although politically and economically a remote possibil-
ity, social security could thus substitute for measures, such as the housing 
programme. The same could, however, be said of ‘development’, social and 
economic policy, and the ability of everyone in society to participate herein. 
54 Grootboom (n49 above) para 35.
55 Grootboom (n 49 above) para 36.
56 Grootboom (n 49 above) para 78.
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As it is ‘development’ that supplies many of the entitlements and capa-
bilities we need to live a life of dignity, equality and freedom. This strongly 
emphasises the horizontal character of rights, and suggests that the right to 
development, seen as the realisation of all interdependent rights,57 is in the 
final analysis, what makes socio-economic rights real. Nevertheless, if social 
security payments are to substitute for a governmental housing programme, a 
strong private market in housing ought to be there to enable people to access 
this right. It is clear that the general functioning of society is implicated in this 
view of rights, and a particular role for the state vis-à-vis a well functioning 
and equitable market, healthy environment and just social context.
4.5  The governance of non-State actors
If we have a horizontal regime of rights, how do courts ensure that rights are 
realised adequately? In the absence of a minimum core, it becomes difficult 
to determine this as there cannot be any concrete standards of delivery. This 
indeed seems to be the single most important strength of a minimum core 
approach. Another solution to this problem does present itself, and draws on 
the right to approach a court,58 and the communicative dynamic that would 
emerge in such a conversation.
The implications of section 38 for the present discussion are obvious and 
far reaching. It not only invokes the idea that a court is the locus of a sub-
stantively open dialogue about rights, but also affirms rights of members of 
organisations and/or the public over the State and associations or groups in 
society. Read together with sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution, which imply 
substantive horizontality, it strengthens powers of ‘anyone’ listed over such 
non-State (and State) actors. It makes the horizontality of rights real, in the 
sense that ‘anyone’ listed may act when rights are violated by ‘anyone’ else.
It is also clear that the open and transparent dialogue that section 38 
engenders is one where influence could travel both from and to the State, 
and from and to citizens vis-à-vis associations and firms. This participatory 
ethos complements the participatory ethos of the State in its engagement 
with the public in social policy development. This section structures account-
ability towards rights in a democratic, as opposed to a technical, way. This 
has dangers, as not everyone has the ability or means to approach a court, 
but in the final analysis an abstract standard would have to be subservient 
57 Sengupta A ‘The human right to development’ (2004) 32 Oxford Development Studies 179.
58 Section 38 of the Constitution deals with the enforcement of rights. This creates the court as a forum 
where society may participate in the conversation about rights, and any aspect of rights could in 
principle be raised there. The relevant section reads as follows:
 ‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the 
Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including 
a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are —
 (a) anyone acting in their own interest;
 (b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;
 (c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;
 (d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
 (e) an association acting in the interests of its members.’
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to access to the courts as well. Accountability is thus in the final analysis a 
democratic accountability.
Section 38 does not only apply to the act of realising rights, it could also 
open up an organisation or firm to outside review. It safeguards the voice 
rights of members of an association, or beneficiaries of a firm, over them. In 
addition, it allows access to such organisations. Accountability to the general 
public is now also a feature of the horizontal realisation of rights. Private 
organisations that affect the enjoyment of rights will now find that interested 
parties might have access to their workings because their conduct affects 
rights and is thus in the public interest. The democratic character of such 
organisations will increase, and the content of a right will better reflect its 
social meaning.
This democratic character – susceptibility to outside interests – has another 
advantage. Because members and beneficiaries are not always the same, the 
competencies of voice and exit will fall short when services and care are 
extended to persons (beneficiaries) outside the organisation. Placing access 
to a court alongside voice and exit rights could help in making organisa-
tions accountable to persons whose voice and possibility of exit cannot affect 
the organisation. What we, therefore, have is an organisation that is com-
pelled, possibly in a discursive fashion, to be democratic internally as well as 
externally, and to deliver services with a public ethos. The information that 
members may bring to an organisation through their voice rights, would allow 
the development of differential measures to satisfy the right. It would make 
the right, in a radical sense, appropriate. The organisation or firm has to open 
itself to those who may be outside the organisation, but have an interest in 
its workings. Both these requirements would make the organisation public in 
character. Justiciability in this context thus means that non-State actors that 
realise rights have to uphold a public character. It is thus necessary to explore 
further how democratic governance can be realised in the context in which 
an organisation functions, and whether the services delivered are indeed rel-
evant to the right in question. Civil society as a creature of its constitutional, 
social and political context would thus be further compelled to exhibit public 
and democratic tendencies.59
59 Cohen J and Rogers J ‘Secondary associations and democratic governance’ (1992) 20 Politics and 
Society (Special Issue: Secondary Associations and Democracy) 426 clearly state that this demo-
cratic character of associations and their social dialogue is not a matter of fact. We have to keep 
in mind that ‘the ‘right’ sorts of associations do not arise naturally. It then proposes to supplement 
nature with artifice: through politics, to secure as associative environment more conducive to demo-
cratic aims’. They add: ‘Groups and group systems differ not only quantitatively but qualitatively 
with respect to such features as the pattern of their internal decision-making, their inclusiveness 
with respect to potential membership, their relations to other associations, and the nature and extent 
of their powers. The art of associative democracy consists in matching group characteristics with 
assigned functions and – now admitting the fact of artifactuality – cultivating those characteristics 
appropriate to functions consistent with the norms of egalitarian democracy.’ (428)
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5  CONCLUSION
Certain requirements for State and non-State action are implied in the 
discussion above. The duties of the State (besides its incontrovertible final 
responsibility for rights) concern it as a regulative and facilitative entity. The 
State must make resources available to compensate non-State actors, but 
should also develop a regime to regulate the funding of non-State actors by 
other non-State actors. It should also be aware that economic regulation can-
not, in the final analysis, be left only to market forces, and it is necessary 
to see economic regulation as an instrument to realise rights. In this sense 
issues, like competition law, the dominance of certain firms in certain sectors, 
and the dominance of certain sectors over the economy, need to be given 
attention.
As far as the governance of civil society is concerned, the State should 
understand its responsibilities in this regard as going beyond a negative obli-
gation based purely on the right to association or assembly. It does imply that 
civil society be given access to institutions of economic regulation, but it also 
implies certain changes to the regime of civil society as far as the relationship 
between beneficiaries, recipients and donors is concerned. It is necessary to 
develop fora where development aid and its effects on the realisation of rights 
may be discussed. It is also necessary to give attention not only to how the 
voice of the beneficiary can feature in such a forum, but also in the democra-
tisation of civil society itself. Attention should be given to the voice, exit and 
access rights of potential and actual beneficiaries to civil society organisa-
tions that are active in the terrain occupied by rights. It also demands that 
we appreciate the need to empower the public in the realisation of rights, and 
in this sense we should acknowledge the artifactuality of the public sphere, 
civil society and economic actors and their regulation. Rights make demands 
on non-State actors, and the character of non-State actors should reflect the 
needs of society, the requirements of democracy, and the progressive devel-
opment of human capabilities.
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